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THE IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL CREDIT ACT 34 OF 2005 ON THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF A MORTGAGE BOND: SEBOLA V STANDARD BANK OF 
SOUTH AFRICA LTD 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) 
 
MM Fuchs
 
1  Introduction 
 
When a mortgagor is in default and the mortgagee wants to enforce the debt, the 
National Credit Act 34 of 2005
1 may apply. If the mortgagor (who is a protected 
consumer in terms of the NCA) is in default, the mortgagee must deliver a section 
129(1) notice to the consumer thereby drawing the default to the attention of the 
consumer.
2 
 
Sections 129(1) and 130(1) of the NCA are of cardinal importance and provide for 
the procedures that should be followed by a credit provider before debt enforcement 
can take place. They provide as follows: 
   
Section 129 Required procedures before debt enforcement 
(1) If the consumer is in default under a credit agreement, the credit provider - 
(a) may draw the default to the notice of the consumer in writing and propose 
that the consumer refer the credit agreement to a debt counsellor, alternative 
dispute resolution agent, consumer court or ombud with jurisdiction, with the 
intent that the parties resolve any dispute under the agreement or develop and 
agree on a plan to bring the payments under the agreement up to date; and (b) 
subject to section 130 (2), may not commence any legal proceedings to enforce 
the  agreement  before  -  (i)  first  providing  notice  to  the  consumer,  as 
contemplated in paragraph (a) (ii) meeting any further requirements set out in 
section 130. [My emphasis] 
 
Section 130 Debt procedures in a Court 
(1) Subject to subsection (2), a credit provider may approach the court for an 
order to enforce a credit agreement only if, at that time, the consumer is in 
default  and  has  been  in  default  under  that  credit  agreement  for  at  least  20 
                                                 
   Michelle MM Fuchs. LLB (UP). Admitted Attorney, Conveyancer and Notary of the High Court of 
South  Africa.  Postgraduate  Research  Assistant,  Department  of  Private  Law,  UNISA.  Email: 
fuchsmm@unisa.ac.za. The author is currently enrolled for a LLM (UNISA) with the title of her 
dissertation  Execution  measures  regarding  immovable  property  in  South  Africa  under  the 
supervision of Prof S Scott. 
1   The National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (hereafter referred to as the NCA). 
2   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd  2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [45]; Otto and Otto  National 
Credit Act Explained (2013) 111; Van Heerden and Coetzee 2012 Litnet (Akademies) Regte. MM FUCHS      PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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business days and - (a)at least 10 business days have elapsed since the credit 
provider delivered a notice to the consumer as contemplated in section 86 (9), 
or section 129 (1), as the case may be; (b) in the case of a notice contemplated 
in section 129 (1), the consumer has- (i) not responded to that notice; or (ii) 
responded to the notice by rejecting the credit provider's proposals; and (c) in 
the case of an instalment agreement, secured loan, or lease, the consumer has 
not surrendered the relevant property to the credit provider as contemplated in 
section 127. [My emphasis] 
 
In the recent Constitutional Court judgment of  Sebola v Standard Bank of South 
Africa Ltd
3 it was held that before instituting action against a defaulting consumer, a 
credit provider must provide proof to a court that a section 129(1) notice of default 
(i) has been despatched to the consumer's registered address and (ii) that the notice 
reached the appropriate post office for delivery to the consumer, thereby coming to 
the attention of the consumer.
4 In practice the credit provider must obtain a post -
despatch  "track and trace"  print-out from the website of the South African Post 
Office.
5 
 
The  Sebola  judgment overturned an earlier interpretation of the section 129(1) 
notice in  Rossouw v Firstrand Bank  Ltd.
6  After the  Sebola  judgment  there is a 
heavier burden on a credit provider to ensure that the notice is sent and delivered to 
the defaulting debtor. The credit provider has to prove on a balance of probabilities 
that the notice was delivered and came to the attention of the defaulting consumer. 
 
2  The facts of Sebola 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
The  judgment  was  handed  down  on  7  June  2012  in  the  Constitutional  Court  by 
Judge Cameron. It concerns an application for leave to appeal against a full bench 
decision of the South Gauteng High Court. Standard Bank obtained default judgment 
against Mr and Mrs Sebola (consumers) after it had instituted action to declare the 
                                                 
3   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC). 
4   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [87]. 
5   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [76]. See further Otto and Otto 
National Credit Act Explained (2013) 116. 
6   Rossouw v Firstrand Bank Ltd 2010 6 SA 439 (SCA). MM FUCHS      PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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Sebolas'  immovable  property  specifically  executable.
7  An  appeal  against  the 
judgment of a single judge of the same court was dismissed by a full bench of the 
High Court.
8 The High Court refused to grant the rescission application prepared by 
the Sebolas in September 2009. Both the single judge and the full bench had to deal 
with the question of whether or not a section 129(1) notice read with section 130 of 
the NCA requires that a defaulting consumer should actually receive the notice.  
 
2.2  Background 
 
Mr and Mrs Sebola signed a mortgage home loan agreement in November 2007 with 
Standard Bank and received a loan of R1 312 000.
9 Standard Bank secured the loan 
with a mortgage bond over the Sebolas '  home. The Sebolas chose their home 
address in the mortgage home loan agreement for jurisdiction and address purposes 
to which "any legal proceeding" were to be served, and they declared that  "letters, 
statements and notices may be delivered" to a post office box in North Riding.
10 
 
The Sebolas defaulted on their mortgage home loan agreement in 2009 by falling 
into arrears with their monthly bond payments.
11 The Bank sent a notice of default 
as required by section 129(1) of the NCA by  registered post to the specified post 
office box in North Riding on 16 March 2009.
12 A summons was subsequently issued 
on 25 May 2009 in the South Gauteng High Court for the full outstanding amount of 
R1 156 092,30, including costs and interest.
13 The Sheriff confirmed on the return of 
service that the summons had been served on 27 May 2009 by affixing a copy to the 
Sebolas' front door, which was the chosen domicilium.
14  
 
The Registrar of the South Gauteng High Court granted default judgment against the 
Sebolas. This was done before the Constitutional Court judgment in  Gundwana v 
                                                 
7   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [1]. 
8   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [1]. 
9   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [4]. 
10   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [4]. 
11   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [5]. 
12   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [5]. 
13   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [6]. 
14   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [6]. MM FUCHS      PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
 
 
380 / 392 
Steko Development,
15 where it was held that judicial oversight is necessary where an 
application  is  made  for  a  sale  in  execution  of  mortgaged  property  against  a 
judgment debtor's primary residence. A court may grant such an order only after all 
the relevant circumstances of the debtor have been taken into consideration.
16 The 
default  judgment  against  the  Sebolas  was  granted  on  25  September  2009,
17 
whereafter a writ of attachment was obtained on 17 November 2009.  It was only at 
this stage that the Sebolas became aware of the judgment against them and applied 
for rescission of the default judgment.
18  
 
The Sebolas stated in their application for rescission of the default judgment that 
they had not received the section 129(1) notice or the summons issued by the 
Bank.
19  They proved this by attaching a post office "track and trace" record to their 
application that reflected that the notice had been received by the Halfway House 
post office  instead of the North Riding post office.
20  Therefore the notice was 
delivered to the wrong post office by the postal services and the Sebolas could by no 
means have received the notice. The Sebolas further stated that they could not have 
received  the  served   summons,  because  their  home  is  situated  in  a  housing 
development where no entry was given to any Sheriff on the day the return of 
service was indicated.
21 A single judge dismissed their application.  
 
The Sebolas appealed to the full bench of the South Gau teng High Court.
22  The 
appeal was dismissed with costs by the full bench on 11 August 2011. The court 
relied on and held itself bound
23  by the decision in  Rossouw v Firstrand Bank,
24 
where it was held that proof of despatch by the credit provider to the cons umer's 
chosen domicillium address is sufficient to comply with the requirements of section 
129(1). Proof that the consumer had received the notice therefore was not required. 
                                                 
15   Gundwana v Steko Development 2011 3 SA 602 (CC). 
16   See Van der Walt and Brits 2012 THRHR 322-329. 
17   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [7]. 
18   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [7]. 
19   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [9]. 
20   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [5]. 
21   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [8]. 
22   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [11]. 
23   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [14]. 
24   Rossouw v Firstrand Bank Ltd 2010 6 SA 439 (SCA). MM FUCHS      PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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The Sebolas applied for leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court by submitting 
that the Supreme Court of Appeal failed to accord sufficient weight to constitutional 
principles in light of the NCA's objectives.
25 Leave to appeal was granted. 
  
3  The judgment of Sebola 
 
The  Sebolas  on  appeal  argued  that  the  Bank  had  not  complied  with  the  notice 
requirements  of  section  129(1).  The  Constitutional  Court  therefore  analysed  this 
section of the NCA. 
 
A  credit  agreement  can  be  enforced  in  court  by  a  credit  provider  only  once  the 
requirements of sections 129 and 130 have been adhered to. If a consumer is in 
default  and  a  credit  provider  wants  to  enforce  the  credit  agreement,  section 
129(1)(a) provides that the default may be drawn to the notice of the consumer in 
writing by the credit provider,
26 and section 129(1)(b)(i) provides (subject to section 
130(2)) that a notice must be provided to a consumer, in accordance with section 
129(1)(a) before a credit provider may commence with any legal proceedings to 
enforce the credit agreement. For a nu mber of years there has been uncertainty
27 
about the interpretation of section 129, and how it affects the  execution procedure 
in the case of a mortgage bond over immovable property. 
 
Before the purpose of a section 129(1) notice can be determined it is imp ortant to 
understand the purpose of the NCA. In Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Hales
28 
it was held that the NCA must be interpreted with a well-balanced approach. When a 
court interprets any section of the NCA it must do so in a manner that gives effect to 
the objectives of the NCA.
29 This Act was implemented (i) to promote  a fair and 
                                                 
25   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [17], [36]. 
26   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [45]. 
27   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [34]. See also Van Heerden and 
Coetzee 2012 Litnet (Akademies) Regte 256. 
28   Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Hales 2009 3 SA 315 (D) 322B-C. 
29   Otto and Otto  National Credit Act  Explained  (2013) 6-7;  Otto and Otto  National Credit Act 
Explained (2010) 6-7. MM FUCHS      PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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accessible credit market; (ii) to protect consumers;
30 and (iii) to ensure equity in the 
credit  market  by  balancing  the  respective  rights  and  responsibilities  of  credit 
providers and consumers.
31  
 
The purpose of the NCA is pursued through the  "consensual resolution of disputes 
arising from credit agreements".
32  A section 129(1) notice plays an essential role in 
achieving this purpose by requiring a credit provider to draw a defaulting consumer's 
attention to the fact that he may pursue the assistance of a  "debt counselor, 
alternative dispute resolution agent, consumer court or ombud"
33 with the objective 
of reaching an agreement with the credit provider.
34    
 
The important question that had to be determined in  Sebola was whether or not a 
credit provider should prove that the section 129(1) notice came to the notice 
(attention)  of  the  consumer.
35  Judge  Cameron  emphasised  that  section  129(1) 
cannot be interpreted in isolation, but must be read with section 130(1)(a).
36 The 
judge referred to three issues which should be considered:  First, a credit provider 's 
obligations, on the one hand, and what he is permitted t o do, on the other, cannot 
be established without interpreting both provisions.
37  Judge Cameron
38 explained 
that: 
 
Section  129  prescribes  what  a  credit  provider  must  prove  (notice  as 
contemplated) before judgment can be obtained, while section 130 sets out how 
this can be proved (by delivery).  
                                                 
30   In  Rossouw  v  Firstrand  Bank  2010  6  SA  439  (SCA)  32  appeal  judge  Maya  held  that  the 
legislator's main objective with the Act was to "protect the consumer from exploitation by credit 
providers by, inter alia, preventing predatory lending practices; to ameliorate the financial harm 
which a consumer may suffer where unable to meet his obligations under a credit agreement 
and  generally  to  achieve  equity  in  the  lending  market  by  levelling  the  playing  field  between 
parties who do not have equal bargaining power". 
31   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd  2012 5 SA 142 (CC)  [36]; s 3(d) of the NCA; see 
further Otto and Otto National Credit Act Explained (2013) 8; Otto and Otto National Credit Act 
Explained (2010) 108. 
32   Section 3(h) of the NCA. 
33   Section 3 of the NCA. 
34   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [46]. 
35   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [57]. See further Otto and Otto 
National Credit Act Explained (2013) 115. 
36   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [52], [56]-[57], [59]. 
37   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [53]. 
38   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [54]. MM FUCHS      PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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Secondly, both sections require that written "notice" must be given to a consumer, 
but do so in different ways.
39 Section 129(1)(a) provides that a credit provider "may" 
"draw the default to the notice of the consumer "
40 and section 129(1)(b) provides 
that a credit provider  "may not commence legal proceedings" to enforce the credit 
agreement before a notice as contemplated in section 129(1)(a) has been provided 
to the consumer. Section 130(1) provides that 10 business days must pass from the 
time that "the credit provider "delivered" a notice to the consumer as contemplated 
… in section 129(1)" before a credit provider is allowed to commence with court 
proceedings  to  enforce  the  credit  agreement.
41  Section 130(1)(a) explicitly refers 
back to section 129(1).
42 The third important issue is that the two sections have 
different focuses but achieve the same end result, namely, the delivery of a notice to 
a defaulting consumer as contemplated in section 129(1). Section 129(1)(a) focuses 
on the defaulting consumer and entitles him to a  "notice" with a specific content – 
the  credit  provider  therefore  "may"  provide  him  with  such  a  notice.  Section 
129(1)(b)  obliges  the  credit  provider  to  give  such  notice  because  he  "may  not" 
commence with proceedings against a defaulting consumer unless this notice has 
been given,
43 while section 130(1) places an obligation on the  notice-provider to 
"deliver"  such  a  section  129(1)  notice.
44  Judge  Cameron
45  gave  the  following 
substantiation of his conclusion that a credit provider must "deliver" such a notice to 
a consumer: 
 
No means of direct proof lies within the reach of a credit provider who wishes to 
enforce an agreement.  It is for this reason that section 130 imposes on the 
credit provider the obligation to 'deliver' the notice.  
 
Therefore, when a credit provider has given notice to a consumer in terms of section 
129(1), he must provide proof and satisfy a court that this notice was "delivered" to 
the  consumer.  Judge  Cameron
46  admitted  that  determining  the  meaning  of 
                                                 
39   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [54]. 
40   Section 129(1)(a) of the NCA. 
41   Section 130(1)(a) of the NCA. 
42   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [54]. 
43   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [55], [72]. 
44   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [55], [57], [72]. 
45   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [57]. 
46   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [61]. MM FUCHS      PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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"delivered" in section 130(1)(a) is not an easy task with a clear answer. Neither the 
NCA  nor  section  130(1)(a)  gives  a  definition  of  the  word  "delivered".  The  court, 
however, found some indications in section 65(1) and 65(2)
47 of the NCA, which 
provides as follows: 
 
Section 65 Right to receive documents 
(1) Every document that is required to be delivered to a consumer in terms of 
this Act must be delivered in the prescribed manner, if any. (2) If no method has 
been prescribed for the delivery of a particular document to a consumer, the 
person  required  to  deliver  that  document  must  -  (a)  make  the  document 
available to the consumer through one or more of the following mechanisms - (i) 
in person at the business premises of the credit provider, or at any other location 
designated by the consumer but at the consumer's expense, or by ordinary mail; 
(ii) by fax; (iii) by email; or (iv) by printable web-page; and (b) deliver it to the 
consumer  in  the  manner  chosen  by  the  consumer  from  the  options  made 
available  in  terms  of  paragraph  (a)  (National  Credit  Act  34  of  2005).  [My 
emphasis] 
 
Section  65(2)  assists  in  the  quest  of  determining  the  meaning  of  "delivered" 
mentioned in section 130(1), because it is applicable in circumstances where  "no 
method  has  been  prescribed  for  the  delivery  of  a  particular  document  to  a 
consumer" as in section 130(1).
48 Section 65(2) points out that  "if no method has 
been prescribed for the delivery of a particular document to a consumer ", the 
document  must  be  made  "available"  to  the  consumer  through  one  of  the 
mechanisms provided in section 65(2)(a) by the person who is obliged to deliver the 
document.
49 
 
Although registered mail is not given as one of the modes of delivery in section 
65(2), the Constitutional Court confirmed  Rossouw v Firstrand Bank Ltd,
50 where it 
was held that section 65(2) also covers delivery per registered mail.
51 Appeal judge 
Maya in Rossouw v Firstrand Bank Ltd
52 pointed out that registered mail is a  "more 
                                                 
47   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [63]. See further Otto and Otto 
National Credit Act Explained (2013) 115-116. 
48   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [66]. 
49   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [67]. 
50   Rossouw v Firstrand Bank 2010 6 SA 439 (SCA) 29-30. 
51   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd  2012 5 SA 142 (CC)  [68]. See also  Otto and Otto 
National Credit Act Explained  (2013) 115;  Van Heerden and Coetzee 2012  Litnet (Akademies) 
Regte 256. 
52   Rossouw v Firstrand Bank 2010 6 SA 439 (SCA) 30. MM FUCHS      PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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reliable means" than ordinary mail, since there is no practical way to prove that a 
document sent by ordinary mail has been received by the addressee. The judge 
therefore concluded that the despatch of a section 129(1) notice by registered mail 
to a specified address is required for delivery in terms of section 130(1)(a). Judge 
Cameron
53 agreed with this point of view but added that more weight and certainty 
needs to be attached to section 130(1 )(a) read in conjunction with section 129(1). 
To comply with the requirements of these sections, more than mere  "despatch" of 
the notice is necessary. Bearing in mind the high importance given to a section 
129(1) notice, the judge held that for a section 1 29(1) notice to be effective, the 
credit provider should take reasonable measures to bring the notice to the attention 
of the consumer. He must therefore present proof that the notice  "on a balance of 
probability reached the consumer".
54 The judge held that this will normally mean 
that a  "credit provider must provide proof that the notice was delivered to the 
correct post office".
55  
 
In practical terms this means that a credit provider will have to acquire a post -
despatch "track and trace" print-out from South Africa's Post Office website.
56  This 
"track and trace" print-out will enable the credit provider to determine which post 
office received the notice that was sent by registered mail. The credit provider 's 
summons or particulars of claim must declare that  the notice was delivered to the 
applicable post office and that the notification slip was delivered to the consumer. 
Such a notification slip notifies a consumer that a registered item was received for 
his collection.
57 Should a consumer aver that the noti fication slip sent by the post 
office was not received or was not collected, a court must determine, regardless of 
                                                 
53   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [68], [72]. See further Van 
Heerden and Coetzee 2012 Litnet (Akademies) Regte 256. 
54   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [74]-[75]. 
55   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [75]. 
56   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [76]. Judge Cameron anticipated 
that some uncertainty may occur in the lower courts after this judgment, and therefore gave 
useful practical guidelines in [ 76]-[79], [86]-[87] to credit providers to avoid any uncertainty 
when the increased burden of proof needs to be satisfied. These guidelines will assist a credit 
provider to deliver an effective section 129(1) notice which will comply with the NCA. 
57   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [77]. MM FUCHS      PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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the credit provider's proven averments, if the consumer's statement could be true, in 
which case the court proceedings must be suspended.
58   
 
Applying this interpretation of sections 129(1) and 130(1)(a) to the facts of the case, 
the court found that the Sebolas agreed in their mortgage bond that documents 
could be delivered by normal post to their North Riding post box.
59  The Bank 
delivered the notice to the Sebolas' North Riding post office and therefore complied 
with the bond agreement. However, it had a further obligation to prove that the 
notice had been received by the correct post office.
60  The Bank was unable to prove 
that the notice reached the relevant post office. Consequently the court rescinded 
the judgment against the Sebolas, and the court proceedings were suspended until 
the Bank corrected its omission.
61  Leave to appeal was granted and the appeal 
succeeded. The order of the High Co urt was set aside and was replaced with the 
following order:  "The application for rescission of the default judgment is granted 
with costs".
62  
 
4  Conclusion  
 
This very important judgment by Judge Cameron overturned the judgment of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Rossouw v Firstrand Bank Ltd.
63 To my mind Rossouw 
followed a more reasonable approach to the section 129(1) notice and provide more 
certainty on the section 129(1) notice requirement.
64  It held that if a section 129(1) 
notice is sent per registered post, proof that the notice has reached the correct post 
office (as recorded in the credit agreement by the parties) will be sufficient proof of 
delivery to the consumer and therefore will comply with the requirements of section 
129(1).  The  Sebola  judgment  confirms  the  Rossouw  judgment  but  adds  an 
                                                 
58   Sebola  v  Standard  Bank  of  South  Africa  Ltd  2012  5  SA  142  (CC)  [79],  [87].  In  terms  of  s 
130(4)(b) the court will be adjourned. 
59   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [80]. 
60   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [81]. 
61   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [81]. 
62   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [89]. 
63   Rossouw v Firstrand Bank 2010 6 SA 439 (SCA). 
64   See also  Van Heerden and Coetzee  2012 Litnet (Akademies) Regte  285; Eiselen Unpublished 
Bulletin. MM FUCHS      PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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additional evidentiary requirement, namely that proof needs to be provided that the 
section 129(1) notice (i) has been despatched to the consumer's chosen address and 
(ii) that the notice reached the appropriate post office for delivery to the consumer, 
thereby coming to the attention of the consumer.
65 The Sebola judgment can  be 
summarised as follows: 
 
Section  129(1)(a)  requires  a  credit  provider,  before  commencing  any  legal 
proceedings to enforce a credit agreement, to draw the default to the notice of 
the consumer in writing.  It has been described as a 'gateway' provision, or a 
'new pre-litigation layer to the enforcement process' (Nedbank v National Credit 
Regulator 2011 3 SA 581 (SCA) para 8).  Although section 129(1)(a) says the 
credit provider 'may' draw the consumer's default to his or her notice, section 
129(1)(b)(i) precludes the commencement of legal proceedings unless notice is 
first given [sic].  So, in effect, the notice is compulsory (2012 5 SA 142 (CC) para 
54). The requirement that a credit provider provide notice in terms of section 
129(1)(a) to the consumer must be understood in conjunction with section 130, 
which  requires  delivery  of  the  notice.  The  statute,  though  giving  no  clear 
meaning to 'deliver', requires that the credit provider seeking to enforce a credit 
agreement aver and prove that the notice was delivered to the consumer. Where 
the  credit  provider  post  [sic]  the  notice,  proof  of  registered  despatch  to  the 
address  of  the  consumer,  together  with  proof  that  the  notice  reached  the 
appropriate  post  office  for  delivery  to  the  consumer,  will  in  the  absence  of 
contrary indication constitute sufficient proof of delivery.
66 [My emphasis] 
 
If a consumer avers that he did not receive a section 129(1) notice, proceedings will 
be stayed and will resume only after the steps that a credit provider should follow 
have  been  complied  with.
67  Therefore non-compliance with the requiremen ts of 
section  129(1)  notices  will not  be  fatal,  but  will  only  delay  court  proceedings. 
Eiselen
68 argues that to enable a credit provider to comply with this heavier onus, all 
section 129(1) notices must be delivered by registered post. I agree with Eiselen and 
should like to add  that if delivery by registered post is sanctioned as one of the 
methods of delivery by the consumer, the credit provider should also make an extra 
effort to deliver the notice by ordinary post to the consumer 's domicilium address. 
Such a notice will then serve as delivery to a consumer who ignores the notification 
by registered letter. It is clear that compliance with section 129(1) is of the utmost 
                                                 
65   ABSA Bank Ltd v Mkhize 2012 5 SA 574 (KZD) 50, 53, 55-56, 58. 
66   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [87]. See Otto and Otto National 
Credit Act Explained (2013) 116-117. 
67   Sebola v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2012 5 SA 142 (CC) [87]. 
68   Eiselen Unpublished Bulletin. MM FUCHS      PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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importance.  Therefore,  when  a  credit  provider  increases  the  probabilities  of  the 
notice coming to the attention of the consumer, the chances of compliance improve.  
 
Both Eiselen
69 and Otto and Otto
70 made the following suggestions that will assist a 
credit provider when the requirements of  Sebola need to be followed. First, when 
proceedings are stayed due to non-compliance with section 129(1), at least 10 days 
should pass before a credit provider attempts to deliver a notice again. Secondly, 
when proceedings are stayed and a consumer decides to refer the matter to a debt 
counsellor in terms of section 129(1)(a), such proceedings should not resume before 
that procedure has been completed.
71 Eiselen
72 suggests that a credit provider can 
reduce  the  increased  burden  of  proof  by  providing  alternative  mechanisms  for 
delivery of a section 129(1) notice in the credit agreement, such as e-mail or fax.
73   
 
A credit provider who declares in his summons or particulars of claim that a section 
129(1) notice was delivered to the consumer is making a very bold assertion. A court 
should therefore first determine if the notice was indeed  "delivered" in terms of the 
NCA. A credit provider should specify the method/s of delivery which he followed in 
the summons or particulars of claim to eliminate any speculation about whether or 
not he complied with the requirements of the NCA.
74  
 
In commenting on the Sebola judgment both Van Heerden and Coetzee
75 and Otto 
and Otto
76 come to the conclusion that the Constitutional Court went too far with the 
additional compliance requirement for notice in terms of section 129(1). They state 
that the Sebola judgment does not contribute to legal certainty in this regard. This is 
                                                 
69   Eiselen Unpublished Bulletin. 
70   Otto and Otto  National Credit Act Explained  (2013) 114;  Otto and Otto  National Credit Act 
Explained (2010) 108-109. 
71   Eiselen Unpublished Bulletin. 
72   Eiselen Unpublished Bulletin. 
73   When a section 129(1) notice is sent by e -mail or fax to the defaulting consumer, the time of 
despatch and delivery can be confirmed by a confirmation e-mail (when sent by e-mail) or print-
out (when sent by fax). 
74   See s 65(1) and (2) of the NCA. 
75   Van Heerden and Coetzee 2012 Litnet (Akademies) Regte 256, 285. 
76   Otto and Otto National Credit Act Explained (2013) 117-118. MM FUCHS      PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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confirmed by the contradictory high court decision in Mkhize.
77  In this judgment the 
court  held  that  ordinary   mail  is  more  reliable  than  registered  mail,  since  the 
percentage of registered mail that is returned undel ivered is much higher than 
ordinary mail. This view differs from conclusion in  Sebola  that registered mail is 
more reliable than ordinary mail. The authors agree with the viewpoint in  Mkhize 
that held that when a section 129(1) notice was sent with registe red post and the 
delivery was unsuccessful due to the consumer not collecting the letter,  "there is a 
high degree of probability that the consumer has avoided delivery ". Consequently 
the reason why registered mail will more frequently be  returned undelivered might 
be the consumer's  "avoidance tactic", which places a   credit provider in a very 
difficult position. The authors therefore argue that the Constitutional Court in effect 
left a door open for consumers to avoid receipt of the sectio n 129(1) notice, and in 
doing so to circumvent the enforcement of the credit agreement. The additional 
compliance requirement of the Sebola judgment is superfluous and complicates the 
interpretation  of the  NCA in  that it does not take into consideration  th e well-
balanced approach required when interpreting the act. Otto and Otto argue that this 
additional compliance required by Sebola "will only create more headaches for banks 
and other credit providers". Van Heerden and Coetzee agree with Otto and Otto that 
the section 129(1) notice requirements urgently need to be revised and amended by 
the legislator to obviate a credit provider's reluctance when awarding credit, and to 
minimise  increase in the costs of credit that could arise as a result of the addition al 
burden. Such revision would also contribute to legal certainty and avert unnecessary 
evidential headaches. Otto and Otto accept that consumer protection comes at a 
price, but argue that after Sebola this protection is stretched to breaking point. They 
state  that  the  additional  burden  of  proof  does  not  promote  an  "effective  and 
accessible credit market and industry".
78  
 
In conclusion, I agree with these authors that the Constitutional Court overreached 
the boundary of compliance with the section 129(1)  notice requirements. It seems 
that the Constitutional Court lost sight of the requirement that a balanced approach 
                                                 
77   ABSA Bank Ltd v Mkhize 2012 5 SA 574 (KZN) 34-35, 66. 
78   Otto and Otto National Credit Act Explained (2013) 118. See further Van Heerden and Coetzee 
2012 Litnet (Akademies) Regte 284, 286. MM FUCHS      PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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must  be  followed  in  interpreting  the  NCA,  and  tipped  the  scale  in  favour  of 
defaulting  consumers.
79  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  when  a  court  inte rprets  the 
requirements for compliance with section 129(1) the interests of both the credit 
provider and the consumer must always be equally balanced on an  "imperceptible 
scale"  so  that  both  parties  might  enjoy   equal  protection  from  the  NCA.  The 
interpretation in Sebola places an additional burden of proof on a credit provider and 
will probably increase the cost of credit, which in turn would affect the pockets of 
consumers.  Mortgagees  who  wish  to  foreclose  on  their  mo rtgage  bonds  are 
obviously seriously affected by this interpretation and will possibly also discount the 
cost of the additional burden in their bond costs.  
                                                 
79   See Otto and Otto's statement that a credit provider also has legal interests that are entitled to 
protection in Otto and Otto National Credit Act Explained (2013) 8. MM FUCHS      PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
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